2) Biblical and Patristic Foundations of Catholic Social Teaching on Usury

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The early Christian uncompromising rejection of usury in all its forms had its earliest origin in the scriptures. To this day, “a primary source for Catholic social ethics is the social teaching of the Bible.”[1] In the Hebrew Bible, each part of the Tanakh – the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings – contain prohibitions against usury. From the Torah, Leviticus directly proscribes the practice: “You shall not lend him your money at interest” (25:37). Among the Prophets, the Lord said to the prophet Ezekiel: “If a man is righteous and does what is lawful and right... [he] does not lend at interest or take any increase” (18:5, 8). From the Writings, Psalm 15 celebrates the one “who walks blamelessly, and does what is right, and speaks truth from his heart” in part as one “who does not put out his money at interest” (15:2, 5). In the New Testament, Jesus maintained and even intensified this teaching. He taught,

And if you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return (Luke 6:35).

Jesus is saying that not only should people lend without taking interest, but they should also lend even to their enemies from whom they may not even receive back the principal. Jesus wants his followers to give freely to all who have need.

St. Clement of Alexandria

The early fathers of the Church take the teaching of Jesus and the scripture to heart. They seek to follow it literally and in all cases, though, of course, their constant condemnation of the practice of usury demonstrates that the practice went on in full force throughout the patristic period. Sometimes the fathers strongly appealed to the authority of scripture, as with Clement of Alexandria (c. 195), who wrote, “Let it suffice to remark that the Law prohibits a brother from taking usury.”[2] Yet, he also has more developed reasons for his disapproval of usury. He deems it “right not to take usury for money” because he recognizes that it is better “with open hands and heart to bestow on those who need.”[3] If one needs a loan, a gift would serve him still better, and serving others is what Christ means his followers to do. The command against usury, says Clement, is “marked by philanthropy” and concern for the poor.[4]  

Yet not even the notion of using interest for charity would persuade Commodianus (c. 250) that usury could be permissible. Concerning this, he writes,

You have lent on usury, taking twenty-four percent, yet now you wish to bestow charity that you may purge yourself, as being evil, with that which is evil. The Almighty absolutely rejects such works as these. You have given that which has been wrung from tears.”[5]

This passage is interesting. On the one hand, its rejection of usury is absolute. On the other, it describes usury with specificity: “twenty-four percent.” Could this mean that a more moderate interest rate would not be usurious? If so, this would place him against the general opinion of the fathers. “For the Greek Fathers, however…, any percentage above the amount loaned was usury, and usury was equally foul regardless of the percentage of interest.”[6] They regarded it as a kind of theft, always born of avarice. They thought of it as the sale of nothing, a fraud, an abuse. They did not consider the time and risk of the lender as having any value that the borrower could justifiably have to pay for. 

Just as petty theft is still theft and still a sin, so low-interest was still a sin even if its consequences were bearable by all concerned. Commodianus, however, decries usury precisely for its evil consequences. He says it is “wrung from tears.” For Commodianus, then, would an interest rate that did no harm and deprived no one of need be usurious? It seems that, primarily, usury is evil primarily for the harm that it does to the poor.

It is clear that the Old and New Testaments and, in continuity with these scriptures, the fathers of the early Church forbade usury absolutely as a social evil against the poor. In the context of discussing the special concern in the Hebrew prophetic books for the poor and those cut off from familial support structures, Curran, in Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present, writes, “Usury or interest-taking on loans was forbidden, at least in the community”[7] Usury, as discussed above, unjustly afflicted the poor.

This is Curran’s only comment on usury in this book, which, after all, deals not primarily with scripture or Christian antiquity, but with the present and the more recent past. Perhaps it is partly possible to gauge the perceived importance of this issue in contemporary Catholic social thought by looking at the lack of attention paid to it – except as a historical issue – by contemporary Catholic ethicists. Thomas Massaro actually lists interest taking on loans as one of the “economic questions about which the Church has chosen to remain silent.”[8] Specifically, Massaro states, “the Church has chosen to remain silent” on “the proper… interest rates on federal college loans.” Note that his question is not whether or not such interest rates are permissible at all. That seems to be a settled question in contemporary social ethics – but when was it settled and how? Is usury no longer an important issue of social justice?

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[1] Charles E. Curran. Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press,   2002. 2.
[2] Clement of Alexandria. “The Stromata.”Ante-Nicene Fathers. Ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Vol. 2. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1885. 366.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Commodianus. “The Instructions of Commodianus.”Ante-Nicene Fathers. Ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Vol. 4. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1885. 216.
[6] Ihssen, Brenda. “‘That which has been wrung from tears’: Usury, the Greek Fathers, and Catholic Social Teaching.” Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics. Ed. Johan Leemans et al. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011. 128
[7] Curran, 2.
[8] Massaro, Thomas. Living Justice. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012. 124.

1) Usury: Understandings of Just Lending

The Church’s constant condemnation of usury, which has its origins in the teaching of Jesus Christ, excellently exemplifies the nature of Catholic social teaching as contrasted with dogmatic teachings. In the interest of social justice, the Church must always respond to social realities. While the essence and energies of God are constant, human social and economic situations, which include the Church but also everyone else, are in constant flux. While the Church must constantly seek justice and condemn injustice, particularly and preferentially on behalf of the poor, the concrete shape and features of that justice necessarily change in response to new situations. While the Church constantly condemns usury, the definition of usury has necessarily undergone change. Concern for economic justice, however, is changeless.

Usury originally meant the loaning of money with any interest and the early Christian tradition originally regarded this as always a grave sin. Usury has taken many forms and many of these are extant realities. Nowadays, loans with interest are the very stuff of American economic life. Most Americans are in debt – often debt so enormous that, each month, they are able to pay off only the interest – and many accept this as a quotidian fact. The forms and quantities of loans, the types of creditors and debtors, and the rates of interest all vary widely in the present economic milieu – from credit cards to student loans, from mortgages to savings accounts. Usury affects everyone, but most of the upper and middle class in this society do not seem to mind. This is because it does not generally deprive them of the necessities or even the comforts of life. Unfortunately, “at the moment, millions across the globe suffer at the hands of others who would happily keep them in poverty through excessive and crushing interest rates.”[1] The term “usury” has come to mean, not just loaning with interest, but rather, loaning with exorbitant interest. Undeniably, some interest rates are usurious, as is clear from the ruinous and binding effect they have on the lives of many poor.

"Currently the worst manifestation of unjust lending in the United States is the ‘payday’ loan, which is specifically designed to keep people in debt; with interest rates up to 400 percent, these companies amass profits in the amount of approximately $4.2 billion annually, intentionally creating financially desperate circumstances for individuals and their families."[2]

Yet other kinds of interest, such as that gained in savings accounts, seem to do no one any harm. Nonetheless, according to scripture and the tradition of the early Church, any interest rate is usurious. Furthermore, not only were the lives and well-being of the poor at stake, so also was the salvation of the lenders because usury was considered a grievous sin. 

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[1] Ihssen, Brenda. “‘That which has been wrung from tears’: Usury, the Greek Fathers, and Catholic Social Teaching.” Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics. Ed. Johan Leemans et al. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011. 125.

[2] Ibid.

The Same-Sex Marriage Debate is about Sex

One thing everyone still seems to agree about on marriage: it is inherently sexual. Sex is not the only thing or even the most important thing, but if sex is not involved, then it isn't marriage. There is a great deal of talk about marriage as being an essentially loving relationship - "Everyone should have the right to marry the person he or she loves," say many same-sex marriage proponents - but no one is demanding the right to marry his mother or his brother, even though many people do love their parents and siblings. There are different kinds of love. One difference here is sex. There is a rampant confusion in our culture between sex and love. Sex should be loving, but it is not love itself and love is not always sexual. What gay marriage supporters mean is, “Everyone should have the right to marry the person he or she loves and wants to have sex with.” Couples who don't want to have sex with each other likely don't want to marry.

Sex is for making love, but it is also for making babies. Most human cultures have long understood the intrinsic connection of these two purposes and consequently have frequently opposed or even criminalized sexual acts that are inherently sterile, such as masturbation, the use of contraception, and homosexual acts. The cultural acceptance of all these behaviors is behind the recent growing acceptance of gay marriage. I read that when the last of the anti-sodomy laws were eradicated by the Supreme Court in 2003, Scalia predicted it would lead to the acceptance of same-sex marriage, along with a host of other ills. Really, it is just about consistency. I agree with them: if these acts are okay, then of course gay marriage should be legally recognized. Sexual ethics are the only real reason to oppose same-sex marriage. Opposing same-sex marriage while justifying other sexual immoralities within marriage is hypocritical.

U.S. sodomy laws by the year when they were repealed or struck down.

  Laws repealed or struck down before 1970.

  Laws repealed or struck down from 1970-1979.

  Laws repealed or struck down from 1980-1989.

  Laws repealed or struck down from 1990-1999.

  Laws repealed or struck down from 2000-2002.

  Laws struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2003.

If homosexual acts were still illegal, as they were in every state before 1970 and in some states until just ten years ago, then the suggestion of legally recognizing gay marriage would be absurd. The debate over gay marriage is not at its heart just about love, as its supporters wish to claim. It is also necessarily about sex, and homosexual acts should not be legal. Homosexual acts, along with other inherently sterile sex acts, should be legally punished as misdemeanors, not honored with legal privileges.

Edited 7/2/2013 1:45 PM:
 I changed the title and added the following :
"Sex is not the only thing or even the most important thing, but..."
"Sexual ethics are the only real reason to oppose same-sex marriage. Opposing same-sex marriage while justifying other sexual immoralities within marriage is hypocritical."

Edited 7/6/2013 10:15 AM:
I changed "The difference is sex" to "One difference is sex."

6) Conclusion - Saving Knowledge

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The spiritual knowledge made possible by faith is not a secret or hidden knowledge. It is γνῶσις, but it is not Gnostic. An ultimate purpose of knowledge is soteriological, and God pursues the salvation of everyone, not only that of an elite few. The Lord God does not desire the death of the wicked, but rather that they repent and live (cf. Ezek 33:11). To live is to become one with him who is life. To this end, we must come to know God by experience. “Salvation itself begins by a divine act providing direct knowledge of God” (Meyendorff 13). For our salvation, it is necessary for us to come to know the real union of God and humanity in Jesus Christ. Such knowledge is accessible only to those who have faith.

5) Knowledge of God according to Gregory Palamas

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Philosophical challenges to the possibility of apodictically knowing God by direct experience continued into the 14th century (and today), notably in the arguments of Barlaam, who maintained that we can only know God dialectically from “revealed premises.”[24] To the assertion of “certain people” (by which he means Barlaam) that “God is knowable only through the mediation of His creatures,” Gregory Palamas replies that he is “in no way convinced.”[25] Palamas maintained continuity with the teaching of Maximus on the direct vision and knowledge of God as a divine gift.[26] God, present in us, gratuitously makes “direct vision of God” and “direct knowledge of God” possible for his faithful people, independent of rational human knowledge.[27] Palamas says nothing against rational knowledge and in fact values it highly, but he recognizes that God has “hidden… things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes” (Matt 11:25). It is possible by God’s grace, which is abundantly present in our created and Christologically restored nature, for a person without rational knowledge and without knowledge of created beings nonetheless to know God spiritually and directly.

The unknowable God is made knowable to the saints by the transcending of their minds – “for the mind becomes supercelestial.”[28] That is, he who ascended into the heavens has spiritually taken with him all those who are united to him so that they may be “filled with all the immaterial knowledge of a higher light.”[29]  The human mind in Christ has ascended in glory, thus enabling human minds to contemplate that glory directly. Our capacity for ascending in and with Christ to contemplation and knowledge of God is inseparable from our salvation, which Christ accomplishes by uniting us to himself. Only in becoming one with God by grace can we truly know God.

Palamas writes, “God is not only beyond knowledge, but also beyond unknowing.”[30] Palamas then later deepens the complexity of this expression: “In reality there remains an unknowing which is beyond knowledge.”[31] This is the “knowledge that is beyond wisdom” regarded by the irreverent as “foolishness.”[32] No paradox is sufficient to express the experience of the presence God, but both the positive reality of that experience and its absolute ineffability must each be maintained without neglect of the other.

We must not mistake apophatic expressions to be descriptive of the experience of God. They create an absence in the mind in which God’s presence is experienced and known, but that absence is not his presence. His presence is not describable in the terms of absence any more than it is describable in any other terms.

Palamas introduced the concept of God’s essence and energies into the discussion of the knowledge of God, seeking to maintain both the knowability of God by grace and the unknowability of God by nature. Referencing Palamas, Jaroslav Pelikan states the case well, “Since the ousia of God ‘is altogether incomprehensible …, would we have any other means of knowing God truly' if deifying grace and light were not God himself?”[33] In his essence, God is unknowable. In his energies, God makes himself known. We become one with God in his energies and thus can know him directly. This knowledge is accessible to all people of faith.

Palamas also states the relationship of faith to the knowledge of God. He writes, “Faith… alone can attain to the truth that lies above reason”[34] Spiritual knowledge of God, as opposed to the knowledge of reason, is accessible only to faith. Without faith, there is no knowledge of God. Furthermore, without faith, there can be no deification and rational knowledge utterly fails to replace faith in this regard.[35] As for Maximus, faith for Palamas does not simply refer to an assent of the intellect to revealed propositions. Rather, it is only a faith lived that enables the believer to come to knowledge of God. “True faith,” in fact, only “comes about by the fulfilling of the commandments” and it “bestow[s] knowledge… through that uncreated light which is the glory of God.”[36] If we love God and keep his commandments, he will give us the gift of true faith, which is a true spiritual knowledge of God and an essential aspect of our salvation by union with God.

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[24] Meyendorff, 6.
[25] Palamas, 25.
[26] “Palamas always remains basically faithful to the thought of St. Maximus who, together with Ps. Dionysius, is the patristic author most frequently quoted in the Triads” (Meyendorff, 13).
[27] Meyendorff, 12, 13.
[28] Palamas, 33.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 32.
[31] Ibid., 36.
[32] Ibid.  
[33] Jaroslav Pelikan. The Spirit of Eastern Christendom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. 269.; Gr. Pal. Against Akindynus. 3. 18.5 (Contos 215-16). 
[34] Palamas, 52.
[35] Ibid., 85.
[36] Ibid., 67.

4) Knowledge of God according to Maximus the Confessor

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St. Maximus the Confessor 

The first sentence of the first century of Maximus the Confessor’s work, Chapters on Knowledge states that God is “incomprehensible” and “not discernable by any being on the basis of any natural representation.”[13] This begins a long apophatic listing of what God is not “insofar as it is possible for us to know” what he is not.[14] So then, Maximus understands knowledge of God to be possible.

How is it possible to know the unknowable God? Firstly, “no knowable object can compare in any way with [God].”[15] God is not like anything that exists. He is being and beyond being. Knowledge of created beings is demonstrable, but knowledge of God is both indemonstrable and “clearer than any demonstration.”[16] This knowledge is a divine gift.

God gives to those who are devout a proper faith and confession which are clearer than any demonstration. For faith is a true knowledge from undemonstrated principles, since it is the substance of realities which are beyond intelligence and reason.[17]

Maximus here identifies the divine source of the knowledge of God. Only God can make himself known, as he does in the person of his Son incarnate among us (cf. John 1:18). Faith is a freely given gift of God. Yet it is not a gift given to all, but only to those “who are devout.” This is the remarkable reality – to know God, we must live the faith devoutly, not merely profess it with our lips or assent to it with our rational minds. Having stepped out in faith and followed the Lord, he gives us no mere guesses, but certain assurance of his relational presence in our lives. Faith is the substance of reality, and it is not, as many suppose, whimsical and defiant belief.

Evagrius
MS 285 c. 1485
Armenian Patriarchate
Kaffa Monastery

In calling faith “the substance of realities,” Maximus clearly draws on Hebrews: “Now faith is the substance (ὑπόστασις) of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Heb 11:1). It is not a far cry from this passage in Hebrews to understanding faith as “a true knowledge.” The term “substance” attests to the truth and essential reality of what one hopes for and believes in faith and the term “evidence” attests to the justification of that hoped for and believed in truth. Faith, then, is the justification of true belief. “Faith is a true knowledge.” Yet, faith as true knowledge does represent a development of the doctrine of the knowledge of God. “In speaking of faith as true knowledge, Maximus is clearly correcting Evagrius, who saw the two as different realities.”[18] 

Apparently, it was difficult for Evagrius to accept, just as it is difficult for many contemporary thinkers to accept, the full implication of Hebrews’ teaching on faith. Perhaps this is because so many limitedly understand faith as mere belief or strong opinion. There is a problem in English with the term “I believe,” which commonly translates πιστεύω. “I believe” carries multiple senses. It can mean either “I have faith” or “I have an opinion.” This range of meaning is not so wide with the Greek term, πιστεύω. Пιστεύω comes from πίστις, which means “faith.” Пιστεύω is usually translated “I believe,” but more literally it means, “I have faith” and cannot really mean, “I have an opinion.” Yet, there are semantic problems with this term in Greek as well. Belief is an act of human will, while faith is a gift of God. Yet, we humans must cooperate with God in receiving this gift and he has given us the freedom to resist it absolutely.

Maximus identifies two hindrances to the attainment of “the knowledge of divine contemplation.” Firstly, those who fail to find knowledge despite searching for it with toil “fail because of a lack of faith.”[19] Faith is the primary means of knowledge. Secondly, they fail because they are “foolishly in rivalry with those who have knowledge.”[20] Humility and asceticism are prerequisites, along with faith, for the attainment of knowledge of God.

It is not enough simply to believe the truth about God – believers must also live the faith. Only faith truly lived is true knowledge. “The one who seeks knowledge for the sake of display” will not succeed.[21] One who would attain knowledge must first prepare “by practice, first on the body, then on the soul.”[22] Significantly, the external and ascetic bodily practice of the virtues (πρακτική) precedes that action in the soul. This is “an indispensible prerequisite of contemplation,” which is, “the perception or vision of the intellect (νοῦς) through which one attains spiritual knowledge (γνῶσις)."[23] To come to the knowledge of God, it is first necessary to act according to the way of faith. Remarkably, here is an epistemology not entirely caught up in the life of the mind, as if reason and rationality were the sole things worthy of consideration when it comes to such an abstract notion as knowledge. Believers in Christ must truly live out their faith in all humility and love if they are to know anything of God. Mere philosophizing will attain to no true knowledge of God, who we can only truly know by authentic direct experience.

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[13] Maximus Confessor. “Chapters on Knowledge.” Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings. New York: Paulist Press, 1985. 1:1; 129.
[14] Ibid. 1:2; 129.

[15] Ibid. 1:8; 130.
[16] Ibid. 1:9; 130.
[17] Ibid. 1:9; 130.
[18] Berthold, George. “Notes.” Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings. New York: Paulist Press, 1985. 171.
[19] Maximus. 1:19; 132.
[20] Ibid. 1:19; 132. 
[21] Ibid. 1:20; 132.
[22] Ibid. 1:20; 132.
 [23] G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware. “Glossary.” The Philokalia. Vol. 2. London: Faber and Faber, 1981. 381.

3) There are Two Kinds of Knowledge

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1) There is the knowledge of reason (διάνοια), which logically “draw[s] conclusions or formulate[s] concepts deriving from data provided either by revelation or spiritual knowledge or by sense observation.”[5] This kind of knowledge is the most recognized as knowledge by much of the contemporary world, especially with the rise of materialistic empiricism that considers sense observation to be the only reliable source of knowable data. Though this is a false premise, we must not allow this to motivate us to discount rational knowledge. “Even though what [rational knowledge] says about God may not be entirely adequate, it says nothing which is opposed to God.”[6] The fathers do not discount rational knowledge, but they insist that there is also another, deeper, truer kind of knowledge.

2) There is also spiritual knowledge,[7] which is

the knowledge of the intellect (νοῦς) as distinct from that of the reason (διάνοια). As such, it is knowledge inspired by God, and so linked with contemplation (θεωρία) and immediate spiritual perception.[8]

Spiritual knowledge directly apprehends or perceives “the inner essences or principles of created beings” and ultimately even “divine truth itself.”[9] Only by direct experience of God can one come to know God spiritually.

+ Fr. John Meyendorff

Mental concepts are utterly inadequate to the task of knowing divine truth. Yet, as St. Gregory Palamas writes, “the human mind… transcends itself,” making knowledge of God accessible by direct experience.[10] Knowledge of divine truth is necessarily ineffable and one can only begin to express such knowledge apophatically. Yet, as John Meyendorff writes,

apophatic theology is much more than a simple dialectical device to ascertain the transcendence of God in terms of human logic. It also describes a state, beyond the conceptual process, where God reveals himself positively to the “spiritual senses,” without losing anything of His transcendence.[11] 

Because of the inadequacy of words to describe the experience of the presence of God, negated terms more closely approximate the truth of God, but even these terms must be negated, for God transcends even their contradiction. Negative theology must not convey an absence of God nor agnosticism toward God, but rather his transcendentally knowable transcendent presence. “The mystical presence of God experienced through [apophatic knowledge] transcends the possibility of being defined in words.”[12] 

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[5] G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware. “Glossary.” The Philokalia. Vol. 2. London: Faber and Faber, 1981. 386.
[6] Staniloae, 95. 
[7] This is how the editors of The Philokalia translate γνῶσις, which is knowledge itself. 
[8] Palmer et al., 387.
[9] Ibid., 386.
[10] Gregory Palamas. Gregory Palamas: The Triads. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983. 32.
[11] John Meyendorff. “Introduction.” Gregory Palamas: The Triads. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983. 15.

[12] Staniloae, 95.