Against Contemporary Iconoclasm

            I think one of the most important defenses of icons in the current culture is the psychological. The creation of images as memorials for absent departed loved ones is a nearly universal human custom. For example, even among many who object to the Catholic and Orthodox use of images in worship, there is often widespread use of photography. I have explained it this way to Protestant objections before. When asked why my church is filled with images of Jesus, his mother, and the saints, I have responded with the question, “Do you have a picture of your mother?” The answer is usually yes. Our culture unquestionably accepts images for this purpose, which is really a way of showing love and respect for those dear to our hearts. As Christians, Jesus, his mother, and the saints should be as dear to our hearts as any members of our family should be, so icons are a fitting way to remember and venerate them. It is a natural human response to look lovingly upon the image that reminds us of the one we love. This is a part of the human nature, just as is the capacity to be represented by an image.

            Furthermore, it is essential to remember that we are not purely spirit, but also body and that God created our bodies and means for us to worship him in and with our bodies as well as with our spirits. There is no better way to worship Christ with our eyes, which he blessed, than to venerate icons – unless it is to see Christ in our neighbors who are also true icons of God.

            In offering this veneration to icons, it is important to distinguish between veneration and worship. We worship God alone. We worship him through the icon, but we do not worship the icon. The icon is an aid in our worship of God and worthy of its own veneration for this reason – for the reason that it points us to God. 

Historical Theological Defense of Icons

Though questions of politics and the locus of Church authority – that is, whether or not the emperor ought to have a deciding voice on doctrinal matters – weigh heavily in the historical dispute over icons, the doctrinal questions themselves are worthy of careful consideration. Furthermore, it is worth bearing in mind that, though it is intuitive to ascribe iconoclastic tendencies among Christians to external Jewish and Muslim influences, iconoclasm historically found as much support from within the Greek Christian tradition as from without it. Nonetheless, the Jewish origin of Christianity and the consequent Christian acceptance of Jewish scriptures certainly gave the iconoclasts the opportunity to point to the all-important prohibition of images found in the Decalogue as a proof-text. Christianity had inherited from Judaism an abhorrence of idolatry – which was shared by iconoclasts and iconodules alike. Earlier iconoclasts particularly focused on their claim that the veneration of icons was idolatrous.

Iconoclasts appealed to the authority of scripture and the early church fathers, which railed always and everywhere against the worship of idols. They neglected, however, to account for the images God commanded for use in worship (for example, the golden cherubim over the ark) in the very same books – especially Exodus – that condemned idolatry. This tension between right and wrong use of images exists already in the Old Testament along with the implicit acknowledgement that not all use of images is idolatrous.

Iconoclasts appealed to a particular understanding of the nature of images. Constantine Kopronymos went so far as to call an image homoousios with its subject. Icons, therefore, he considered false images, because a true image of Christ would be God himself, just as Christ, the image of the Father, is one in essence with the Father and is God. In a sense, Constantine V is not against worshipping images, but against worshiping icons, which are not, in his view, true images. Only Christ (and Christ in the Eucharist) is a true image. This is a failure to appreciate what an icon actually is and is not. An icon, as John of Damascus would later assert, is more like a mirror reflection of the one it portrays. It is an imitation. A painting of Christ is an image of Christ, who is an image of the Father. There is more than one sense of image. An icon is like an image of an image. It is not Christ himself, but his reflection. It is obvious that paint on a board is not one in essence with the Father! Iconodules were not suggesting otherwise. They worship God and God alone – God who has become man – man, who by his very nature can be imaged with paint on a board.

Later iconoclasts focused more on the Christological implications of iconography.  They claimed that because Jesus Christ is one person with both a divine and human nature, it is impossible to make an image of him. The divine nature cannot be circumscribed. Divinity is invisible by nature. It could only be, therefore, that an icon portrays only the human nature. This much is true, but the iconoclasts went on to assert that making such an image separates the two natures of Christ. Such an assertion fails to recognize fully the reality of the incarnation. It is, as John of Damascus said, a type of Docetism. Christ was visible to the eyes of his disciples both before and after his resurrection. This visibility, characteristic of human nature, also lends itself naturally to circumscribability. If the iconoclasts were right in thinking that portraying Christ’s image separated his humanity from his divinity, then Christ himself would have made this separation every time he appeared to his disciples in visible flesh. No. Rather, as a person both fully God and fully man, he is fully circumscribable in his human nature. This is the reality of the incarnation – a reality so profound that iconoclasts had difficulty fully accepting it. To deny that an image may be made of Christ is to deny that he is fully man. To deny that this image is worthy of veneration is to deny that his humanity is one with God. 

Would it be possible to have an ideal American Rite melding features of the Byzantine tradition and American culture?

Though skeptical of all things American, I do think it evangelically important to inculturate the Gospel, which should include, for example, the use of vernaculars. Inculturation is particularly and notoriously difficult in America, which lacks any one culture. America is a place of many coexisting – but only limitedly interacting – cultures. It is also a place of rampant individualism, which is utterly contrary to the Gospel. It would certainly be possible to meld features of Byzantine tradition and American culture – which has happened historically to a small degree – but there would be nothing “ideal” about an “American Rite.” 

Is a united American Eastern Church a realistic possibility?

When first immigrating to the United States, Eastern Christians usually intended to return to their homelands and thus considered themselves as in diaspora. Despite new circumstances, the mother Churches often continue operating from this conception. Though continuing as minorities, Eastern Churches in this country now have generations of history, American cultural characteristics, and numbers enough to regard them as a particular Church. Really, it doesn't makes sense for one location to have five or more Eastern bishops representing various jurisdictions. This redundancy weakens the ability of the Eastern Churches to evangelize, to catechize, and to do all that the Church must do in the world. 

This jurisdictional unity could only happen if the Churches would seek it and would self-identify first as Eastern Christians rather than as this or that ethnic group. Until Eastern Christians in the United States stop referring to themselves primarily as Russians or Ukrainians or Rusyns or Greeks or Arabs or this or that ethnicity rather than primarily as Christians, they will poorly reflect the one Church they truly are. 

5) A Contemporary Pastoral Approach to Usury

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Usury and Profiteering
by Albrect Dürer

Whereas in former eras it may have been usual for confessors to hear anxiety about any small interest taken on a loan, in the present era they are not likely to hear any concern over it at all. If usury of any kind is a sin, it is news to most of the faithful. Consciences  are often ill formed on the subject - or not formed at all. Many Catholics have swallowed completely the assumption of capitalist economies that the endless pursuit of gain is worthwhile and permissible. Money and possessions – once widely regarded by Christians as dangers to the well-being of the soul, temptations to avarice, and as obstacles to relationship with God (cf. Matt 6:24; Luke 16:9-13) – many now regard instead as signs of God’s blessing. This is an interesting cultural and theological change. It may be time for pastors to address this issue, so dear to the consciences of the early Christians, with those entrusted to their care.

The changes that the social teaching on usury has undergone compound the problem of teaching effectively on proper lending practices. The one constant has been concern for the welfare of the poor. The primary reason that some kinds of low-interest loans are permissible is because, in the current economic system, these can actually help the poor directly, rather than hindering or enslaving them. Other high-interest loans practiced in this economy remain usurious – even sinful in their oppression of the poor – and pastors should again condemn these practices forcefully. Radically, loans should exist primarily for the benefit of the borrower, not the lender. The Church must constantly seek economic justice and condemn economic injustice on behalf of the poor. In the present economic situation, that may no longer mean a unilateral condemnation of all kinds of interest taking, but it must still mean condemning usurious interest.

4) An Eastern Christian Perspective on Usury

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Metropolitan Hierotheos
(Vlachos) of Nafpaktos

Contemporary Eastern Christian commentators on usury are few. One important Eastern Christian thinker on this subject, however, is Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos of Nafpaktos and Agios Vlasios, who is probably most famous for his book Orthodox Psychotherapy. In his essay, “Interest, Usury, Capitalism,” Vlachos provides a nuanced perspective on usury that is substantially in harmony with the contemporary Catholic understandings of the subject discussed in the last post. Concerned to demonstrate continuity with the Hellenic fathers on this subject, he condemns usury in the strongest possible language. However, he also provides an understanding of usury that does not include every instance of interest taking. He acknowledges some exceptions.

For example, he writes, “In certain cases like acquiring a house, one can say that loans are beneficial.” Housing is a legitimate need and if a loan provides for this need without harming anyone, then it is worthwhile. He continues, “In these cases, a fair society can be of help to those in need – without of course causing damage to those who aren't.” Should the lender violate that principle by charging usurious rates of interest, the loan would be impermissible. If the rates are not usurious, however, and “if this is put into effect in a legal and fair manner, then it can function along the principle of brotherly love.” Even balanced and measured benefits for the banks are legitimate, he writes, so long as they do not impede the freedom of the borrower.

A second exception he brings up is the use of savings accounts. He writes,

According to contemporary reality, the hoarding of money in Banks is considered a necessity and interest is something fair and legitimate. No one can deny such a logical possibility, especially for householders.

However, people can use something as seemingly innocuous as a savings account immorally, Vlachos maintains. What principally matters is the intention. If the account exists to provide for need, then it is a good. If, however, it exists to provide for the passions, then it is an evil. Vlachos writes,

The crucial matter is that when bank savings are seen in the context of the passion of acquisition and avarice, and more so when charity and philanthropy are withheld and Man’s hopes now hinge on money and his faith in God’s Providence is cast out, then this cannot be justified by ecclesiastic morality.

As noted above, Vlachos condemns usury with the strongest possible language: “We must stigmatize and cauterize usurers who exploit the anguish of their fellow-man and who remain unemotional in the presence of their misfortune.” Vlachos does not understand usury to be avoided simply by mutual agreement or mutual benefit. Rather, taking interest may only be justified as a means of providing for legitimate needs – not as a way of providing for unnecessary pleasures or comforts. For, in the service of these ends, it deprives one of opportunities for charity and philanthropy. He writes, “When lending is linked to hedonism, easy living, bliss, the quest for wealth etc., then it cannot be acceptable.” There is a tendency, particularly in American society with its highly inflated luxurious standards of living, to regard pleasures as needs and comforts as requirements. Condemning this capitalist attitude, Vlachos writes, “We should not increase our “needs.” We should not strive to live opulently; that way, we will not be forced to borrow money, because that is the way we will lose our freedom.”

As a means of avoiding the subjugation consequent to the multiplication of perceived “needs,” Vlachos recommends two things. Firstly, he recommends frugality and “the ascetic lifestyle, which also involves avoiding luxury and bliss.” Secondly, he recommends generosity and a reasonable detachment from our possessions. He writes, “Those who have money should practice philanthropy and provide interest-free loans to those who are in need of money for coping with the hardships of their life.” Therefore, while lending with interest is at times morally permissible, this does not absolve the wealthy from the moral obligation to lend without interest in ways that will benefit the poor, which Jesus commands (Luke 6:35). 

As with the Catholic understanding, Vlachos sees need or poverty as the barometer of determining whether an instance of lending with interest is usurious. If a particular loan results in providing for genuine needs all around and avoids the stain of avarice then it may indeed be justifiable. A principle for the rich to keep in mind when they lend to the poor is to offer the loan not for their own profit or gain primarily, but for the good of the poor to whom they lend. Should the wealthy loan with subjugating interest – as still happens today – it remains a moral crime.

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3) Usury in the Catholic Social Documents

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 John Paul II, in his 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS), states that “the Church does not have technical solutions to offer” and that “the Church does not propose economic… systems or programs, nor does she show preference for one or the other, provided that human dignity is properly respected and promoted.”[1] This proviso keeps the Church in the discussion on usury. While it is true that the economic situations of contemporary life are scarcely comparable to those of Christian antiquity, and that thus it is improper to follow unilaterally the economic and social prescriptions of antiquity in the present context, it is also true that the Church’s concern for human dignity and her concern for the welfare of the poor remains. Consequently, while some interest rates on loans may now be permissible, usurious interest rates are not. The meaning of "usury" now requires nuance. 

            In his landmark 1891 encyclical on social justice, Rerum Novarum (RN), Pope Leo XIII demonstrates an awareness of the constant teaching of the Church in condemnation of usury. He writes that “rapacious usury” has increased the evil of “misery and wretchedness, [which] press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor.”[2] Such usury, he writes, “although more than once condemned by the Church, is nevertheless, under a different form but with the same guilt, still practiced by avaricious and grasping men.”[2] Leo XIII acknowledges that the Church has repeatedly condemned usury and he repeats that condemnation for the same reasons. However, he introduces a descriptor perhaps previously unnecessary – “rapacious.” To condemn “rapacious usury” is perhaps to indicate that there may be usury that is not “rapacious.” Perhaps, given new economic conditions, there could be interest rates on loans that are not motivated by greed or excess.

            Leo XIII gives a clearer idea later on in the encyclical about what he might mean by rapacious usury: “The rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workman’s earnings… by usurious dealing.”[3] In this paragraph, he lays down the principle that makes usury evil. He writes, “To make one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine.”[3] He makes clear that rich employers must refrain from “usurious dealing” against their poor workers “because the poor man is weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness.”[3] Usury, then, is an evil because it deprives the poor of even the little they have earned – thus keeping them poor and beholden to their creditors. The poor must be given aid and opportunity to overcome their poverty, not loans designed to keep them bereft even of the little they could otherwise accumulate. The Church always opposed usury due to its tendency to oppress the poor.


            Forty years after Rerum Novarum, Pius XI demonstrates an understanding of the grave importance of lending practices and the effect they can have on the whole of society. In 1931, he writes in Quadragesimo Anno (QA),

"In our days…, immense power and despotic economic domination is concentrated in the hands of a few…. This power becomes particularly irresistible when exercised by those who, because they hold and control money, are able also to govern credit and determine its allotment,[4] for that reason supplying, so to speak, the life-blood to the entire economic body, and grasping, as it were, in their hands the very soul of the economy, so that no one dare breathe against their will."[5] 

Those who determine who may receive loans and at what interest rates, however ruinous, have far too much power over the poor. This is especially so given that those most likely to attain to such high positions may tend to be precisely those least likely to demonstrate compassion for others. “Unrestrained free competition… permits the survival of those only who are strongest. This often means those who fight most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of conscience.”[6] If these “strongest” are the people to whom regulation of interest rates is given, those who are “weakest” – the poor – have much to fear. It is necessary to ensure that those with the needs of the poor foremost in mind are those who determine interest rates.

            
          With concern for the poor, Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical of 1961, Mater et Magistra (MM), continued the Church’s teaching on usury by repeatedly emphasizing the role of government in regulating credit, along with many other economic issues, with the ultimate goal of overcoming gross economic inequalities.



          Pope Paul VI, with his 1967 encyclical Populorum Progressio (PP), may have been the first Church authority to every actually recommend loans as a means of helping the poor. Loans are one of many means of working toward “building a world where every man… can live a fully human life, freed from servitude.”[7] Just as it is clear that usury can be a means of causing servitude, so does Paul VI now recognize that loans with low interest can actually be an aid toward climbing out of a position of servitude. Speaking specifically about the benefits of wealthy nations lending money to developing countries, he writes, "Rates of interest and time for repayment of the loan could be so arranged as not to be too great a burden on either party, taking into account free gifts, interest-free or low-interest loans, and the time needed for liquidating the debts."[8] He recommends as means of aid firstly, “free gifts,” secondly, “interest-free… loans,” and only lastly, “low-interest loans.” The preference for absolute giving in charity remains. However, it is nonetheless remarkable for a pope to refer positively to low-interest loans when the fathers of the Church regarded interest of any kind as a grave sin.

           Usury – in the sense of high-interest loans – remains a problem to this day. The comparatively recent (1986) USCCB document of the, Economic Justice for All (EJA) found it necessary to observe injustices taking place due to high interest rates. For example, “persistent high interest rates that make it difficult to repay or refinance loans” for many farmers experiencing various economic problems in the 1980s.[9] These “otherwise viable family farms… are threatened with bankruptcy or foreclosure.”[10] The USCCB recommends a policy of “reduced rates of interest and programs of debt restructuring” to correct this injustice.[10] In other words, those in a position to do so should alleviate the suffering of those laboring under usurious interest rates.

            The USCCB also recognizes, however, the possibility of offering low-interest loans as a means of aiding the poor. Echoing Populorum Progression, Economic Justice for All specifically recommends that industrialized nations provide assistance to Third World nations in the form of “low-interest/long term loans.”[11] However, it first recommends not loans but “grants.” A gift remains the primary recommendation, though now bishops of the Church are comfortable recommending moderate interest rates as a means of assistance to the poor, whereas long ago any interest rate would have been considered theft. A principle for the rich to keep in mind when they lend to the poor is to offer the loan not for their own profit or gain primarily, but for the good of the poor to whom they lend.

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[1] SRS 41; Catholic Social Thought: A Documentary Heritage (CST). Ed. David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2012. 455. emphasis mine. 
[2] RN 2; CST 15.
[3] RN 17; CST 21.
[4] The phrase, “determine its allotment,” is elsewhere translated, “rule the lending of money.”
[5] QA 105-106; CST 67.
[6]  QA 107; CST 67. 
[7]  PP 47; CST 264. 
[8]  PP 54; CST 266.
[9] EJA 223; CST 749. 
[10] EJA 242; CST 753.  
[11] EJA 265.